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Foreword
‘Research shows…’ is an all-too-common turn of phrase in policy reports and political debate. 
These two small words instil great confidence: they imply that policy-making rests on solid 
grounds, that it is based on objective facts.
But opinions may be divided about the facts. The Netherlands has witnessed repeated 
controversies in recent years concerning the way in which policymakers use science. The 
controversies have concerned such divisive issues as the underground storage of carbon 
dioxide, exploratory drilling for shale gas, and vaccinations against cervical cancer.
In this study, we look at six recent controversies and attempt to answer the following questions: 
In what way do policymakers call in scientific expertise? How do other parties (local residents, 
local authorities, civil society organisations) respond? Is there a lack of trust in science in such 
cases? And what lessons can we learn from the way that policymakers and scientists have dealt 
with public controversies?
This is a subject that touches upon the core mission of the Rathenau Instituut: the study of 
science and technology in public contexts. Life in a ‘technotope’ - an environment dominated by 
technology - forces us, as citizens, to tackle difficult questions. Should I have my daughter 
vaccinated against cervical cancer, and what side-effects will that vaccination have? Will shale 
gas drilling destroy the landscape in my environment? What health risks will a mobile phone 
mast pose if it is installed in my neighbourhood?
Scientific evidence is needed to answer these questions, but this study shows that such 
evidence is not enough to address public unrest. Science does not serve as an independent 
arbiter in such cases; it is itself drawn into the controversy. Each of the parties involved invokes 
its own truth and digs its heels in deeper as the controversy continues. The cases described in 
this report show that while new modes of consultation can be created, this usually happens too 
late in the process, when public resistance has already gathered too much force and viewpoints 
have become intransigent.
These cases offer policymakers and the scientists involved in policymaking valuable lessons 
that show them how to deal with public opposition in new ways. One of the most important 
lessons is that it is impossible to remove all scientific uncertainties. We will have to make do with 
a kind of science that is ‘good enough’ and ensure that the policymaking process also 
acknowledges the broader public concerns and interests involved. The Rathenau Instituut would 
like to help policymakers use scientific evidence in new ways that will allow them to generate 
greater public support for their policies.
Jan Staman
Director, Rathenau Instituut
The Hague, May 2014
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Part I Introduction
Evidence-based policy
Policymakers are increasingly turning to science to substantiate their policy measures. There is 
much to be said for evidence-based policy of this kind (Slob & Staman 2012). Many of the 
political and social issues that we face in our high-tech society are so complex that scientific 
evidence is indispensable to the policymaking process. That is certainly true of developments in 
medicine, food safety and the long-term sustainability of our energy supply, but it can also be 
said about our ability to manage the financial crisis or the risks and opportunities associated 
with the information society, to give just a few examples. Policymakers and politicians assume 
that their policy decisions will be more persuasive if they can give scientific arguments to 
support those decisions.
But the practice of invoking science is not always trouble-free. In the Netherlands, a series of 
recent public controversies has raised questions about evidence-based policy. They include 
public unrest about the inclusion of a vaccine against cervical cancer in the Dutch State 
Vaccination Programme, protests against licences granted to conduct exploratory drilling for 
shale gas, and the political fuss kicked up about errors in the climate assessment reports 
issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
These controversies are often associated with declining public trust in science (KNAW 2013, 
Dijstelbloem & Hagendijk 2011). However, a recent public survey by the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy and the Rathenau Instituut denies that trust in science is generally declining 
or that distrust in science is growing. In fact, the survey shows that the public still holds 
‘science’ in high regard (Tiemeijer & De Jonge 2013). What it also reveals, however, is that 
public trust falls off sharply as soon as scientific research is used for commercial and 
policymaking purposes. The controversies mentioned above - the HPV vaccine, the exploratory 
drilling for shale gas, and the IPCC reports - appear to point in the same direction.
These findings indicate a paradoxical situation. Specifically, the survey shows that the public’s 
appreciation of science depends largely on the contribution that scientific research makes to 
such societal objectives as good healthcare, safe food, prosperity and the quality of life. But it is 
precisely with regard to public wellbeing that scientists are forced to collaborate with 
government, businesses and other parties. In all the uproar caused by the HPV vaccine or 
IPCC report controversies, not a single party argued that policymakers should cease drawing 
science into their discussions. For now, fact-free politics has very few fans. The question that 
does arise is: when is the public’s trust in science at risk, and what is needed to retain that trust?
Prerequisites for trust
In this study, we review six recent public controversies in the Netherlands about evidence-
based policy in order to consider the prerequisites for trustworthy science. In doing so, we aim 
to gain a better understanding of why, in these particular cases, the use of scientific evidence in 
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policymaking led to public disquiet. We also explore what is needed to win public support for 
evidence-based policy.
The key questions we pose are the following:
-   When and how do policymakers call on scientific expertise?
-    How do other parties respond (local residents, civil society organisations, local 
authorities, and experts who have reached differing conclusions)?
-   What role does scientific evidence play in allaying controversy?
-   To what extent does public trust in science or distrust of science play a role?
-    And finally, what lessons can we learn from the way that scientists and policymakers 
have dealt with public controversies?
This study is intended mainly to help policymakers understand what they need to do to generate 
public support for evidence-based policy, and to give scientists and policymakers guidelines for 
dealing more effectively with public opposition. Scientists and policymakers are thus the main 
target groups of this study.
Six public controversies
We have selected six examples of evidence-based policy that led to public controversies in the 
Netherlands. In each case, scientific arguments were used to substantiate policy proposals or 
policy measures; in each case, again, the policy proposals and measures came under fire in 
part because the public disputed the scientific evidence. Most of the case studies were written by 
external authors.
The six cases are:
1.   Electromagnetic radiation by mobile telephone masts (authors: Marijke Hermans,   
 Marjolein van Asselt and Wim Passchier);
2.    Inclusion of HPV vaccine in the Dutch National Vaccination Programme (authors: Albert 
Meijer, Paulus Lips and Huub Dijstelbloem);
3.    Underground storage of carbon dioxide (authors: Suzanne Brunsting, Eefje Cuppen and 
Ynke Feenstra);
4.   Exploratory drilling for shale gas (author: Tamara Metze);
5.   IPCC climate assessment reports (author: Monique Riphagen);
6.   Food safety: the EHEC bacterium (author: Franck Meijboom).
Part II consists of six summarized case studies that focus on the factual sequence of events. 
The detailed case studies can be found at http://www.rathenau.nl/publicaties/publicatie/
wetenschap-als-strijdtoneel.html. In Part III, we use the questions listed above to analyse the 
cases, based in part on the analysis (or proposed analysis) of the authors of the case studies.
By comparing the six cases, we have noted certain patterns that would not have emerged if we 
had simply studied a single case. In anticipation of the case analysis in Part III, we will briefly 
mention a few of these patterns below. This will also give readers something to go by when they 
read the (abbreviated) case studies in Part II.
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Public unrest
In each of the cases, the policy proposals or policy measures provoked public unrest at a 
certain point. Often, the unrest had several causes: a concern about environmental or health 
risks, distrust in the National Government’s intentions, or protests against visual pollution. 
The groups involved were also often diverse and included local residents, civil society 
organisations, local authorities and critical experts.
Invoking the evidence
In each of the cases, scientific evidence played an important role in policymaking or policy 
implementation. For example, the Health Council of the Netherlands recommended that the 
Dutch Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport should include the HPV vaccine in the National 
Vaccination Programme, and the National Government’s climate policy was based largely on 
the IPCC’s reports. Policymakers often employed long-standing practices, such as statutory 
procedures (environmental impact assessments), or called in the advice of institutes (National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment), advisory bodies (Health Council) or scientific 
platforms (IPCC) founded specifically for that purpose.
In their attempts to allay the public’s fears, the policymakers or companies involved often 
referred to the very same scientific evidence or experts again. For example the National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) responded to the uproar concerning the 
HPV vaccine by once again pointing to the scientific arguments in favour of including the 
vaccine in the vaccination programme.
Counter-discourse
In none of the cases, however, did the scientific evidence soothe the public’s fears. The 
individuals and groups involved felt that their worries had not been taken seriously, and they 
rejected both the ‘official’, government-approved interpretation and the underlying scientific 
arguments. The unrest was aggravated by other experts announcing that they had reached a 
different assessment (of the risk), and by alternative sources of information accessible on the 
Internet. The scientific uncertainties - i.e. the uncertainty concerning detrimental effects on the 
environment and health - are one of the main causes for critical groups to question the 
authorities’ arguments. As a result, a counter-discourse emerged in opposition to government’s 
interpretation.
Stages of learning
In some of the cases, the debate then shifted to finding further evidence in support of policy, for 
example by contracting out new studies meant to remove any existing scientific uncertainties. 
This often included creating platforms for discussion between proponents and opponents and 
involving critical groups in designing the new round of research.
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These new stages and modes of consultation are interesting and can be regarded as innovative 
approaches to dealing with criticism, but in fact they mainly led to the parties resuming their 
previous positions. In most of the cases, they were only introduced at a very late stage of the 
process, after the various parties were already entrenched in their positions and the 
controversy seemed unresolvable. Although the new arrangements served to broaden the 
research agenda, the issue itself continued to be framed in scientific terms. As a result, other 
concerns and interests, for example visual pollution or plummeting property prices, were 
ignored - even though they were partly causing the unrest.
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Part II Case studies
The six summarized case studies follow below. We have based these on the detailed case 
studies written by external authors, available on the Rathenau Instituut website (http://www.
rathenau.nl/publicaties/publicatie/wetenschap-als-strijdtoneel.html).
The abbreviated case studies focus on the factual sequence of events. They document the 
cases until approximately 2012. The shale gas case study also covers more recent events.
1 Electromagnetic radiation by mobile telephone masts 
 original case study written by Marijke Hermans, Marjolein van Asselt and Wim Passchier
Unrest about siting of mobile telephone masts
At the end of the 1990s, there was growing public unrest about the siting of mobile telephone 
masts. There were various concerns: concerns about their effects on health and visual 
pollution, questions about the necessity of siting masts, and the ‘why here?’ question. Local 
residents felt caught off guard when masts began appearing in their area; they needed more 
information, wanted their concerns to be taken seriously, and demanded a say in the decision-
making. The public further distrusted the profit motives of the telecom operators and the role of 
the National Government, which stood to earn billions of euros from the sale of licences. Some 
local authorities also began to oppose the proliferation of masts.
Research on health risks
In response to the unrest, the National Government drafted a new policy on masts in 2000, and 
two years later signed the Antenna Agreement putting the new policy into effect. The new policy 
covered health aspects, the visual adaptation of the masts, and the right of consent for 
occupants of rented housing.
In addition, the Dutch government contracted the Netherlands Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research (TNO) to study the masts’ effects on health. The study (known as the 
COFAM study) revealed that subjects exposed to UMTS signals suffered a diminished sense of 
wellbeing. The researchers were surprised by the outcome and called for more research. The 
Health Council of the Netherlands found that the research was properly conducted, but it raised 
questions about TNO’s interpretation of the results.
The COFAM findings caused a public stir concerning the health risks of mobile telephone 
masts. The protests continued unabated between 2003 and 2006. The local authorities of the 
municipalities of Spijkenisse, Tilburg, Leeuwarden and Blaricum banned the siting of new 
masts. Critical groups (e.g. Stichting Milieuziektes and StopUMTS) also questioned what they 
considered to be the limitations of the COFAM study, or doubted the impartiality of TNO 
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because of its relationship with the National Government and KPN (formerly the state-owned 
fixed-line operator, now a private landline and mobile telecommunications company).
In response to the continuing unrest and to gain greater clarity about the masts’ effects on 
health, the National Government ordered an additional study (in part on the recommendation of 
the Health Council), known as the ‘Swiss study’. In a memorandum to the House of 
Representatives, the Dutch State Secretary for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, 
Pieter van Geel, stated that ‘… the results of the COFAM study are such that replication and 
additional research are desirable and necessary.’ The Swiss study’s results, which showed that 
UMTS radiation did not have any negative impact on health, failed to convince the local 
authorities, however. They claimed that the study had not taken the long-term risks of 
electromagnetic radiation into account. They also grew suspicious when the results of the study 
were held back from publication.
Liaison Group
In response, in 2005 the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment contracted the Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development 
(ZonMw) to carry out a multi-year follow-up study on the effects of electromagnetic radiation. In 
addition, the Electromagnetic Fields and Health Knowledge Platform (EMV&G) was founded, 
whose task was to consolidate relevant expertise and make it available to professionals working 
in the field.
Part of the EMV&G Knowledge Platform was the Liaison Group, which brought together civil 
society organisations, experts and policymakers. The Liaison Group served as the ‘social 
conscience’ of the EMV&G Knowledge Platform. In the group, proponents and opponents 
debated ZonMw’s interim research results and the histories of those whose health had been 
adversely affected by radiation (or who believed it had been).
The Liaison Group meetings did not, however, result in consensus on the findings. In fact, the 
meetings mainly ended in deadlock, with neither party able to persuade the other of its views. 
The discussion then turned to ZonMw’s research design, the criteria on which a literature 
review was based, or the way in which the research was funded. For example, the critics 
argued in favour of studying the cumulative effects of everyday exposure to electromagnetic 
radiation, whereas the researchers pointed out that such exposure could not be measured in 
the laboratory. That failed to convince the civil society organisations, however: ‘… this is not 
what the public is expecting…,’ in the words of the Liaison Group chairperson.
Electrohypersensitivity
The deadlock in the Liaison Group caused the focus to shift to a new issue: help for people 
suffering from electrohypersensitivity. 2011 saw the founding of the ElectroHyperSensitivity 
(EHS) Think Tank, which looked into complaints ascribed to electromagnetic fields. That led to 
another study by ZonMw meant to arrive at an accurate definition of electrohypersensitivity and 
its incidence in the Netherlands. The Think Tank recommended assisting electrohypersensitivity 
sufferers even in the absence of scientific evidence for their symptoms.
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2  Inclusion of the HPV vaccine in the Dutch National   
Vaccination Programme 
 original case study written by Albert Meijer, Paulus Lips and Huub Dijstelbloem
National Vaccination Programme
At the request of the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, the Health Council of the 
Netherlands published a report in 2008 concerning the inclusion of a vaccine against human 
papillomavirus (HPV) in the Dutch National Vaccination Programme. Certain HPV types can 
cause cervical cancer. Approximately 600 women in the Netherlands contract cervical cancer 
every year; about a third of these cases are fatal. In its report, the Health Council advised the 
Dutch Government to include the HPV vaccine in the National Vaccination Programme. The 
Minister adopted its advice. As customary, the National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM) was responsible for implementing the vaccination policy. In early 2009, 
RIVM sent a letter to the target group, twelve-year-old girls in the Netherlands, inviting them to 
be vaccinated. The letter, which was addressed to both the girls and their parents, pointed out the 
importance of lowering the number of deaths caused by cervical cancer.
Public uproar
Contrary to the expectations of the Ministry and RIVM, the vaccination campaign led to a huge 
public outcry. Parents felt as if the vaccination was being forced on them and that they were 
‘bad parents’ if they advised their daughter against it. They felt that they were being forced to 
choose without having enough information about the need for the vaccine, its effectiveness, 
and its risks.
The public’s disquiet was fuelled by the critical comments of various experts. A number of 
specialists criticised the Health Council’s recommendation in an article in the foremost Dutch 
medical journal (Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde) and during a broadcast of Zembla, 
a television documentary programme. The Council, they said, had not taken various 
uncertainties into account, including the vaccine’s possible side-effects. The vaccination was 
also too expensive and its effectiveness had not been sufficiently proven. They concluded that 
the Council should have advised against the vaccine. The producers of Zembla also claimed 
that the scientists involved in writing the Health Council’s report had ties with the 
pharmaceutical industry.
The role of the Internet 
These criticisms were widely disseminated on the Internet. Websites (for example verontruste-
moeders.nl, i.e. ‘worriedmothers’) and YouTube clips pointed out the (presumed) hazardous 
side-effects of the vaccine. For example, stories were circulated that the HPV vaccine could 
cause paralysis, and images of young girls were posted on websites with such captions as 
‘Please think carefully’ and ‘Don’t be a test rabbit’.
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Of particular note was one Anneke Bleeker, a florist with no medical background, who took up 
arms against the established experts on the ‘worriedmothers’ website. She referenced articles 
that - according to the case study authors - ‘came across as scientific’. Worries about potential 
side-effects played a major role in this context. During the Zembla broadcast, Bleeker referred 
to the Thalidomide and DES scandals of the 1960s and 1970s, whose side-effects were 
unknown at the time. Bleeker gradually became the voice of a concerned public.
Deepening controversy
Initially, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and RIVM scarcely responded to the online 
criticisms, if at all. Later, however, Roel Coutinho, Director of the Centre for Infectious Disease 
Control at RIVM and the spokesperson for the vaccination campaign, did respond. He defended 
the Ministry’s decision in television and newspaper interviews. He called the online accounts of 
side-effects and uncertainties about the vaccine ‘tall stories’ and said that the experts who had 
criticised it were ‘damaging’ the campaign.
Coutinho’s reaction only deepened the controversy. The critics felt that they were not being 
taken seriously and viewed RIVM’s information as ‘propaganda’. The public outcry about the 
vaccination eventually meant that in 2010, only 45 per cent of girls had had the full set of three 
vaccinations, whereas more than 80 per cent had been expected. RIVM considered the 
vaccination campaign a ‘failure’.
Misunderstood
The interviews conducted for the case study revealed that the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport and RIVM had vastly underestimated the impact of the online criticisms on the public’s 
willingness to submit to the vaccination programme. Looking back at the torrent of public 
criticism and the disappointing turnout, the experts and policymakers involved said they felt 
misunderstood: hadn’t they done everything possible to improve public health? Interviewed in a 
popular Dutch daily news show, RIVM’s Roel Coutinho expressed his astonishment at the 
uproar and the fact that his authority, accumulated over the course of many years, no longer 
seemed to count.
Unpredictable controversies
The difficulty of predicting how the public will respond to new vaccinations became clear in 
2009, when the Health Council recommended including a vaccine against hepatitis B in the 
National Vaccination Programme. In an interview, Coutinho commented: ‘We thought then that 
the Council’s recommendation and the Minister’s decision to include the vaccine in the 
programme would lead to public unrest, because we figured it would be another controversial 
issue. But nothing happened.’
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3 Underground storage of carbon dioxide
 original case study written by Suzanne Brunsting, Eefje Cuppen and Ynke Feenstra
A new technology
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a process whereby carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, for 
example from coal- and gas-fired power plants, are captured and stored or sequestered 
underground, in depleted gas reserves. The process is controversial because the effects of CO2 
gas on substrata are not entirely clear. There are fears of gas leaks, for example. CCS can, 
however, prevent the release of large quantities of CO2 into the atmosphere, making it an 
effective way of meeting CO2 emission reduction targets.
In 2007, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the intermediary organisation SenterNovem put out a call for tenders for 
demonstration projects involving land-based CCS. Royal Dutch Shell was one of those that 
submitted a tender and in November 2008 it was awarded 30 million euros in funding for its 
project.
In July 2007, various authorities, energy companies and consulting engineering firms published 
a joint report on the general environmental impact of CCS. The purpose of the report was to 
provide background information about the potential for land-based CCS in the Netherlands, a 
subject about which the country had very little knowledge or experience, either technical, 
policy-related or legal. Shell used the report to prepare its Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) scoping document for the project, which was to be sited in the Municipality of 
Barendrecht.
Public unrest
At the start of the EIA procedure, in February 2008, Shell organised an information meeting for 
the residents of Barendrecht. Present at the meeting was a representative of the Ministries of 
Economic Affairs and Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, who was there to explain 
the government’s policy on reducing CO2 emissions and what role CCS would play in that policy. 
After the meeting, the media began to report on the concerns of local municipal councillors and 
residents. They questioned whether the Municipality of Barendrecht was the right location, 
given its population density and the many industrial sites already located there. There were also 
worries about health risks and the potential negative effect on property prices.
The signs of disquiet led Shell to organise a second information meeting a few months later. 
This time, a representative of the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research 
(TNO) was present to explain the technical side of the project. TNO had been contracted by 
Shell to carry out research for its EIA. The representative of national government who had been 
invited to the information meeting cancelled at the last minute. At that time, the tender 
procedure was still under way.
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CO2 Government Consultation Group
In mid-2008, the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment, and a Provincial Executive Councillor for the Province of Zuid-Holland (in which 
the Municipality of Barendrecht is located) decided to set up a CO2 Government Consultation 
Group (BCO2) of municipal, provincial and national government representatives. The purpose of 
the group was for the participants to inform one another about the decision-making process 
and about the project communication activities. Shell also took part in the latter.
The BCO2 participants agreed that each of them would continue using its own communication 
channels. Shell, however, then decided to cease all public communication temporarily and to no 
longer respond to local media reports in order to avoid stirring up any more public unrest.
Knowledge Forums
The BCO2 participants agreed to set up Knowledge Forums and to invite external experts to join 
them. The forums would take the form of four meetings intended to discuss the substrata, 
choice of location, external safety, and risk monitoring.
At the same time, comments by experts began appearing in the media. Hydrologist Cees den 
Akker, who also participated in the Knowledge Forums, was critical about the safety of CCS. In 
his view, it would be better not to carry out the demonstration project in a densely populated 
area. Krijn de Jong, chemistry professor, called CCS beneath Barendrecht an ‘irresponsible 
experiment’.
In March 2009, a CCS information centre funded by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment opened at a shopping centre in Barendrecht. It offered information boards 
and publications by the national government, the project developers, TNO, Greenpeace and 
other parties. Its purpose was to inform local residents. The local authorities refused to 
communicate at this location and set up their own information centre in the town hall.
Growing public resistance
The Ministers of Economic Affairs and Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment visited 
the Municipalities of Barendrecht and Albrandswaard various times in the course of 2009 to talk 
to local public administrators and residents. The Ministers hoped to explain why they found 
CCS so necessary in addition to energy efficiency and renewable energy, and to emphasise 
that safety would be a priority for the project.
 
Local public administrators turned against the project, however. Opposition among local 
politicians grew in September 2009 when a railway accident in Barendrecht cost an engineer 
his life. The local authorities pointed to the accident as evidence that Barendrecht already 
accommodated enough high-risk activity within its borders. In their view, the municipality was 
already doing more than enough in the nation’s interest. Although the National Government had 
the power to put the nation’s interests above local interests (by means of a National 
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Coordination Scheme), the government nevertheless decided to have the National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) investigate the health risks posed by CCS. RIVM 
concluded that the National Government should communicate openly with the public about any 
health risks.
In November 2009, the Provincial Council of Zuid-Holland also turned against the CCS project. 
Emotions ran high at a third information meeting, attended by the Minister of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment, Jacqueline Cramer. The Minister stated on this occasion that 
CCS was ‘absolutely safe’. When the Balkenende Government fell in February 2010, the 
decision concerning CCS had to be postponed. After the new Government took office, the new 
Minister of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, Maxime Verhagen, decided in 
November 2010 that there would be no land-based CCS. Instead, he would investigate the 
option of CO2 sequestration in depleted gas reserves in the North Sea.
4 Exploratory drilling for shale gas
 original case study written by Tamara Metze
‘Sweet spots’
Shale gas is a fossil fuel that can be recovered by means of a special drilling technique 
(hydraulic fracturing, popularly known as ‘fracking’) from layers of shale rock deep below the 
surface of the earth. Fracking involves injecting a chemical mixture into horizontal layers of 
shale rock at high pressure, causing the rock to fracture apart and release shale gas. Shale gas 
extraction could help the Netherlands supplement its dwindling gas reserves in the northern 
part of the country. It can also be regarded as a transitional fuel, i.e. one that will keep the 
Netherlands supplied with energy until renewable sources are sufficiently developed. Shale gas 
extraction could also generate considerable revenues for the national treasury.
UK energy company Cuadrilla identified a number of ‘sweet spots’ in the Netherlands that were 
likely to prove favourable for drilling. After the Municipality of Boxtel granted Cuadrilla a licence 
to do exploratory drilling in 2010, residents of Boxtel and the Municipality of Haaren (both in the 
Province of Noord-Brabant) grew worried. Their concern was fuelled by reports from the United 
States that fracking had led to groundwater contamination.
People living near the intended drilling site in Boxtel and in nearby Haaren banded together in 
two protest groups, Shale Gas-free Haaren and Shale Gas-free Boxtel.
Public unrest
The protest groups were concerned about the health risks and environmental damage that 
fracking could cause. They were also afraid that their house prices would fall and that the 
drilling rigs would spoil their view. As time went on, the campaigners gained the support of 
environmental organisations in the Provinces of Noord-Brabant and Gelderland, Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth Netherlands, and a number of MPs. Scientists also spoke up in the media, 
among them Ko van Huissteden, a physical geographer employed by VU University 
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Amsterdam. The water supply company Brabant Water and Rabobank Bank, which had a data 
centre in Boxtel, were also concerned about the exploratory drilling programme.
Initially, the public disquiet did not cause the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and 
Innovation or the Municipality of Boxtel to change track. The national and local licence 
applications had gone according to procedure, after all. Later, however, they changed their minds. 
In response to worrisome reports, the National Energy Council, the state-owned gas exploration 
company EBN, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation and the State Supervision of Mines 
agency (SSM) pointed out that the relevant incidents in the United States had taken place in 
circumstances entirely different to those in the Netherlands. In their view, neither the legislation 
nor the geological conditions were comparable. For example, supervision was much better 
organised in the Netherlands than in the US. Exploratory drilling would show whether shale gas 
extraction was economically viable in the Netherlands and what environmental risks were 
involved.
Differing opinions
In addition, stated these parties in May 2011, studies conducted by Royal Haskoning engineers 
and TNO had produced very promising results with respect to the geological conditions and 
potential for extraction. The studies involved adapting American research data to the situation in 
the Netherlands. Critics, however, expressed doubts about the geological conditions and 
thought that there should be no drilling whatsoever because of the negative impact on the 
environment. They pointed out that the Province of Noord-Brabant also had a much higher 
population density than the United States.
It was around this time that geologists involved themselves in the debate about shale gas 
extraction. They discussed the effects of fracking on substrata in the Netherlands and on the 
quality of the groundwater, and they also raised questions about the quantity of gas to be 
extracted. The uncertainties led to ever-louder calls to postpone drilling by local public 
administrators, the Province, Brabant Water, environmental organisations and local residents. 
TNO and EBN countered the resistance by stating that it was precisely such questions and 
uncertainties that demonstrated the need to conduct exploratory drilling.
In the same period (May 2011), the Province and the municipal authorities pressed for an 
independent investigation into the consequences of fracking for the environment. In the view of 
the Municipality of Boxtel, the investigation should demonstrate that fracking would not cause 
any damage to public health and the environment. In response, Cuadrilla asked two firms of 
consulting engineers, Royal Haskoning and Oranjewoud, to adapt the results of research on 
Cuadrilla’s British drilling operations to the Dutch situation. After an initial rejection, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation was persuaded of the importance of a 
postponement.
Calls for independent study
September 2011 saw the television broadcast of the American documentary film Gasland. The 
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film led to greater public distrust of the information provided by the Ministry. Secretiveness 
about the chemical substances used in fracking played an important role in this respect. Some 
opponents questioned the Ministry’s impartiality and followed its every move. As a result, there 
were growing calls for an independent study.
In early October 2011, the administrative court in ’s-Hertogenbosch (capital of the Province of 
Noord-Brabant) ruled that exploratory drilling for shale gas should not proceed. The court found 
that the authorities had not followed the correct procedure and had erroneously issued a 
temporary exemption from the zoning plan in order to permit drilling in deep, hard-to-reach clay 
strata.
Faced with public unrest, the court’s ruling and the scientific uncertainties, the Minister decided 
in late October 2011 to suspend drilling and to order an independent study to assess the risks.
Consultation meetings
The discussion then moved on to the independent study and how it should be conducted. At the 
Ministry’s request, stakeholders attended four consultation meetings to hammer out the 
research agenda and decide who was eligible to conduct the study. Critics believed that TNO’s 
ties with the Ministry were too close for it to be candidate. The suggestion was to engage 
research agencies that had not previously worked for the Ministry or the industry. The Ministry 
and Cuadrilla agreed to this.
 
The research agenda also led to dispute. Critics wanted the study to cover data on the 
quantities of shale gas to be extracted and the potential financial revenues. They also wanted 
the study to investigate the desirability of shale gas as a transitional fuel en route to a 
sustainable energy supply. The Minister, on the other hand, felt that any assessment of the 
usefulness and necessity of shale gas extraction should be a political matter and not an issue 
for research agencies to decide. The study as defined by the Ministry was restricted to an 
investigation of the safety and risks of drilling. The issue of the usefulness and necessity of 
shale gas extraction was not included on the research agenda. In spring 2012, the Municipality 
of Boxtel declared itself ‘shale gas free’.
New study
The new study was subject to a European public procurement procedure. In early 2013 the 
contract was awarded to a consortium made up of the engineering firms Witteveen+Bos, 
Arcadis and Fugro.
The study focused on the potential risks and consequences of shale gas drilling (exploratory 
drilling) for nature, human health and the environment. It was to form the basis for further 
political decision-making about shale gas extraction. A liaison group of stakeholders was 
assembled to supervise the study. When the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and 
Innovation attempted to retain some control over the study results by asking the liaison group to 
treat them with confidentiality and discretion, the representatives of environmental 
organisations and local government (e.g. the Municipality of Boxtel) handed in their resignations 
(De Vries, Van Est & Van Waes 2013).
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5 IPCC climate assessment reports
 original case study by Monique Riphagen
Greenhouse effect
In the 1980s, a new subject found its way onto the political agenda: the greenhouse effect. In 
order to furnish policymakers with scientific evidence related to climate change, the United 
Nations set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. Thereafter, the 
IPCC climate assessment reports, published every five or six years, provided the Dutch 
government with an important basis for its climate policy.
Policy summaries compiled by scientists working in conjunction with policymakers were 
published at the same time as the reports. The contents of the policy summaries were adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in a plenary meeting. The expectation was that this 
would provide a broad basis for climate policy. After the first report, each subsequent IPCC 
assessment spelled out the need for stringent climate policy in increasingly harsh terms.
The fourth assessment report, published in 2007, minced no words about the influence of 
human activity on climate change. It gave progressive parties the ammunition they needed to 
push for policy measures. The Dutch Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment, Jacqueline Cramer, agreed with them and referred in that regard to the IPCC 
reports.
Other politicians disputed the need for policy measures meant to mitigate the greenhouse 
effect, however. In particular the right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV) objected to the way in 
which the Minister invoked the IPCC reports. According to this political party, the need for a 
strict climate policy had not been sufficiently demonstrated.
Climategate and Himalayagate
Two incidents involving the IPCC reports, ‘Climategate’ and ‘Himalayagate’, led to an emotional 
political debate in the Netherlands.
The Climategate scandal occurred in 2009. It began when an unknown attacker hacked the 
server at the University of East Anglia (UK) and copied the e-mails of climatologists there to 
other locations on the Internet. The e-mails suggested that these scientists had attempted to 
conceal information disproving climate change and had refused to include publications by 
climate change sceptics in the IPCC report.
This incident was followed by a second scandal in 2010, known as Himalayagate. The scandal 
began with the discovery of an error in the IPCC’s fourth assessment report. The report stated 
that the glaciers in the Himalayas would melt away completely by 2035. The year should have 
been 2350. Other errors also came to light. One of the underlying reports made an erroneous 
statement about the percentage of the Netherlands that lies below sea level. According to 
information provided by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), 55 per cent 
of the country was below sea level. That turned out to be untrue: 26 per cent of the Netherlands 
is below sea level and 29 per cent is susceptible to river flooding.
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IPCC under fire
Because the Dutch government’s climate policy leaned heavily on IPCC findings, the IPCC 
came under heavy fire from the House of Representatives. A number of political parties 
suspected the IPCC of manipulating the facts to support its preconceptions. The supposed 
errors, they said, also showed that the IPCC was ignoring the evidence of climate change 
sceptics.
The Minister, Jacqueline Cramer, asked PBL to investigate whether the report by the relevant 
Working Group contained other errors. PBL discovered a number of further errors and 
inaccuracies, but none that it believed undermined the main conclusions of the 2007 report.
More transparency
PBL did, however, recommend that the IPCC be more transparent about the way in which it 
reached the conclusions set out in its policy summaries. It also recommended minimising the 
risk of error, tightening up quality control procedures, and ensuring a balanced evaluation of 
climate change effects.
The InterAcademy Council (IAC) was asked to evaluate the IPCC’s working methods on behalf 
of the United Nations. The IAC concluded that the IPCC had not adjusted sufficiently to the 
changing demands of society. It recommended improving its management structure, review 
process and transparency. According to the Council, the IPCC had to communicate more 
effectively about scientific uncertainties. It had also failed in its communication about the errors 
it had made.
The IPCC took the IAC’s conclusions to heart. It undertook to make adjustments to its 
processes and procedures.
6 Food safety: the EHEC bacterium
 original case study written by Franck Meijboom
Serious illness
In spring of 2011, the EHEC bacterium was identified as the cause of several cases of serious 
illness in Germany. The EHEC bacterium is a type of Escherichia coli (E-coli) and can lead to 
haemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), a kidney disorder that can be fatal. The only thing that was 
clear at the time was that food had caused the outbreak. Several German research institutes 
launched separate investigations into the source of the infection. At the same time, the outbreak 
spread rapidly across the borders of the German federal states. The World Health Organisation 
(WHO) estimated that fifty people ultimately died of HUS; most of the fatalities were in 
Germany.
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Source of infection unclear
The German research institutes involved communicated uncertainties in the research results in 
various different ways. In a very short space of time, the institutes made several 
announcements concerning the cause of the infection: Spanish cucumbers (Hamburger Institut 
für Hygiene und Umwelt), meat (WHO) and beansprouts contaminated with excrement (Robert 
Koch Institut).
Confusion ensued, both in Germany and elsewhere. Had the contaminated food come from 
Spain, Germany itself, or the Netherlands? With no clear answers in sight, international 
relations also came under pressure. After all, no country wanted to see a key export product 
accused of being the source of a dangerous bacterial infection. When German researchers 
identified the Spanish tomato as the source, tensions between Spain and Germany flared, with 
Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba threatening to take legal action against 
Germany. 
After the German research institutes had failed to trace the source of the bacterium, the 
European Union set up an EHEC task force. The task force took over the work of the German 
institutes and also played a coordinating role. Ultimately, Egyptian fenugreek seeds were 
identified as the culprit, although some parties claimed that this was never conclusively proven.
The National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) reported an outbreak of 
EHEC infection in the Netherlands in 2011. The Dutch government called on RIVM to trace the 
source of the infection. RIVM concluded that all of the Dutch cases of infection were related to 
the outbreak in Germany. No additional investigation was therefore ordered into the source of 
the infection.
Economic losses
European vegetable growers - especially of cucumbers and beansprouts - suffered enormous 
economic losses. In the Netherlands, the ongoing uncertainty about the cause of the infection 
- cucumbers, tomatoes and leaf lettuce were all identified at one point or another - led to losses 
of 157 million euros for vegetable growers and 85 million euros for dealers.
The case mainly demonstrates under how much pressure scientific researchers can be put 
when they are obliged to furnish policymakers with evidence, particularly when the stakes are 
high and time is of the essence. We will return to this subject in Part III of this report.
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Part III Analysis
Patterns of unrest
As we indicated briefly in the introduction, in each of the foregoing cases the policy intentions or 
policy measures provoked public unrest. The unrest had various causes. For example, it 
involved differing parties, ranging from local residents - in some cases united in local protest 
groups - to local and provincial-level politicians and public administrators, national organisations 
such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth Netherlands, critical scientists, and online groups 
such as the ‘worriedmothers’.
The unrest was further fuelled by a wide range of different concerns. They included the fear of 
environmental or health risks, both short-term (gas leaks, earthquakes) and long-term (side-
effects of vaccine, effects of electromagnetic radiation) and worries about declining property 
prices and visual pollution.
In some of the cases, unrest grew because events unfolded in a way that left various groups 
feeling as if decisions had been forced on them without their concerns or interests being taken 
into account. An atmosphere of distrust quickly took hold, not only with respect to licences 
being issued for exploratory shale gas drilling or the siting of mobile telephone masts, but also 
in the uproar about the IPCC climate assessment reports. (And what the latter case 
demonstrates is that critics do not always fault the ‘official’ interpretation for underestimating the 
risks; in the IPCC case, they claimed that the climate assessment reports and the policy based 
on them had in fact overestimated the risks posed by large-scale CO2 emissions.)
Public dissatisfaction and unrest were also expressed in differing ways: at locally organised 
information meetings, by local residents or groups taking action, or in interviews in local or 
national media or on the Internet.
The variety of different response patterns and spontaneous forms of organised protest made it 
difficult for policymakers and scientists to understand or predict the public’s unhappiness. The 
unrest that arose concerning the HPV vaccine is a good example. At first, the Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sport and RIVM ignored the anxious reports on the Internet about the 
potential side-effects of the vaccine. That was not only because they failed to take the reports 
seriously but also because they customarily refrained from involving themselves in online 
discussions, which were more difficult to manage than their exchanges with established 
interlocutors such as patient interest groups. The unpredictability of opposition became clear 
when RIVM launched a vaccination campaign against hepatitis B not long after the uproar 
about the HPV vaccine. It had anticipated protests about this campaign as well, but nothing 
happened.
Relying on established scientific advisory practices
In the cases described above, policymakers responded to the unrest by relying on established 
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scientific advisory practices and evidence-gathering routines. To substantiate their policy 
measures, they pointed to properly conducted licensing procedures (shale gas and CCS), the 
recommendations of the Health Council of the Netherlands (HPV vaccine), or the IPCC’s 
climate assessment reports. In other words, they did not simply call on a random group of 
experts; they brought in research institutes and advisory councils with longstanding reputations 
for excellence. For example, RIVM has for decades been responsible for implementing the 
National Vaccination Programme, and the IPCC is a platform established by the United Nations 
to analyse data collected worldwide about the earth’s climate. It seemed no more than logical 
for policymakers to respond to public unrest by turning to these procedures and established 
advisory practices. After all, they had already shown themselves to be valuable.
Counter-discourse
What is therefore all the more striking is that policymakers were unable to dispel the unrest by 
referencing advisory councils and research institutes founded especially for that purpose. The 
critics were not satisfied with the official, government-backed interpretation and rejected or in 
any event questioned the authority of the experts called in to resolve the issue. A counter-
discourse arose that cast doubt on the evidence produced by the policymakers and relevant 
experts in support of policy. That counter-discourse was fuelled by a variety of different 
sources.
One important source was the uncertainties involved in scientific risk estimation. Scientists 
could say nothing definitive or conclusive about the long-term side-effects of vaccines, the risk 
that shale gas extraction would lead to groundwater contamination, or the impact on health of 
electromagnetic radiation. Critical experts played an important role in this respect, for example 
doctors’ comments on the Health Council’s HPV recommendation, or the questions experts 
raised about the environmental risks and possible output of shale gas extraction. In addition, 
critical groups made use of alternative sources of information such as the Internet. In the 
debate about the HPV vaccine, for example, Web forums referred to the vaccine’s (alleged) 
harmful side-effects. The American documentary Gasland, initially only available online in the 
Netherlands, warned about the risk of fracking leading to groundwater contamination. In all 
these cases, scientific uncertainties gave the critics crucial ammunition for questioning the 
legitimacy of the science underpinning the policy intentions.
Another source was the broader motives and broader interests underlying the unrest, for 
example visual pollution, plummeting house prices or the discomfort that parents feel talking to 
their 12-year-old daughter about her future sexual behaviour. These worries could not be 
removed by the results of a scientific study on environmental or health risks.
The third source was the distrust that critical groups felt towards the National Government or 
businesses. After all, the National Government stood to earn a great deal of money selling 
licences for mobile telephony or shale gas extraction. Businesses (telecom operators, Shell, 
Cuadrilla) cared mainly about earning a profit. That distrust extended to the research 
outsourced by government or businesses, and to the (presumed) ties that research institutes 
such as TNO had with industry or the National Government. The latter played a role in the 
cases involving contract research on the health effects of mobile telephone masts or the 
environmental risks of shale gas drilling.
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In none of the cases was it sufficient for policymakers to rely on established scientific advisory 
practices in response to public unrest. In fact, things often appeared to go wrong right from the 
very start. When policymakers claimed that they were ‘right’ because their science was self-
evident, local residents, parents or municipal councillors felt ignored. The way in which RIVM 
rejected criticisms as ill-informed or discounted them as rumours for which there was not a 
shred of proof made the groups involved feel that they were not being taken seriously. That was 
also true when the Minister, Jacqueline Cramer, claimed in Barendrecht that CCS was 
‘absolutely safe’. It is no wonder that the critics were not convinced.
Focus on the scientific debate
In many of the cases, a shift then occurred: the debate began to focus increasingly on 
substantiating the scientific findings. That was partly because the relevant groups and experts 
expressed criticism of the scientific evidence presented by the policymakers. It was also partly 
because of the way in which the policymakers responded to the continuing criticism: by ordering 
yet more research meant to remove the scientific uncertainties. This response fell into the same 
category as their earlier response, i.e. relying on established advisory practices. For example, 
in the mobile telephone mast case, the ‘Swiss study’ was meant to clarify the health effects of 
electromagnetic radiation. At a later stage, the government even contracted ZonMw to conduct 
a multiyear follow-up study. And in the shale gas case, Royal Haskoning and TNO were asked 
to adjust American research data on the effects of shale gas drilling to the situation in the 
Netherlands.
But the new research results did not settle the controversy. Instead, the critical groups once 
again raised questions, this time about the design of the follow-up studies: the Swiss study had 
incorrectly failed to consider long-term health risks, and the situation in the United States 
differed too much from that of the Netherlands to draw any useful comparisons.
New arrangements
In both cases, the differences of opinion led to calls for more research. And in both cases, the 
critics were involved in designing the research or in interpreting the research data. 
In the shale gas case, the critics’ calls for an independent study led to their being invited to 
consultation meetings organised to establish the research agenda and select the research 
agency. In the mobile telephone mast case, a Liaison Group was established in which interest 
groups debated with policymakers and experts about the interim results of a multiyear research 
programme investigating the effects of electromagnetic radiation and the histories of those 
whose health had been adversely affected by radiation (or who believed it had been). A similar 
development occurred in the CCS case, with Knowledge Forums being created in which 
stakeholders and experts discussed matters such as safety and choice of location.
But these initiatives did not succeed in resolving the controversy. The consultation meetings 
concerning the follow-up study on shale gas drilling mainly led to another disagreement about 
the scope of the research agenda. Whereas the critics felt the study should also concern the 
quantities of shale gas that would be extracted and the financial revenues, the Minister of 
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Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation opposed this. In his view, ‘usefulness and 
necessity’ was a matter to be discussed in the political arena. However, even if the Minister had 
agreed to extend the scope of the research agenda, the controversy had likely become so 
entrenched that the critics would only accept one answer.
The end was also not yet in sight in the debate about the mobile telephone masts. The Liaison 
Group meetings merely led the parties to resume their previous positions, with neither one able 
to persuade the other of its views. The limitations of scientific research played a role in this 
context. For example, the scientific method used (a laboratory setting) meant that it was 
impossible to measure the cumulative effects of everyday exposure, but that was precisely what 
the critics wanted.
The consultation meetings, Liaison Group and Knowledge Forums were new arrangements 
meant to get the opposing parties talking to one another. They widened the circle of 
interlocutors. But there was no way out of the impasse. The proponents and opponents were 
unable to meet each other halfway. Some of the new arrangements did lead to a broader 
research agenda, for example by including the histories of people with electrohypersensitivity in 
the mobile telephone mast case. But they did not alter the fact that the issue was framed in 
scientific terms. Broader concerns and interests that were difficult to address by means of 
scientific research - for example visual pollution, declining property prices or the relationship 
between local costs and national benefits - were ignored, whereas these concerns partly 
caused the public unrest. In addition, the new arrangements were only introduced late in the 
process, after public resistance had already become entrenched, critical groups had begun to 
distrust policymakers’ intentions, and the parties’ positions had become intransigent.
Serviceable truths
The cases do not indicate any broad public distrust of science. They confirm the outcome of the 
survey cited in the introduction, carried out by the Scientific Council for Government Policy and 
the Rathenau Instituut. The case studies indicate that both proponents and opponents of policy 
measures use scientific arguments to substantiate their positions. For example, critics 
emphasised the scientific uncertainties and limitations of the research agenda when critiquing 
the scientific evidence underpinning the policy measures. In some of the cases they also 
requested further research in order to remove existing uncertainties.
What the controversies show is that there are limits to the ability of policymakers to rely on 
established advisory practices. Those limits are in fact closely related to the supportive and 
advisory role of such practices in policymaking. Advisory councils and research institutes such 
as the Health Council, RIVM or the IPCC need to supply policymakers and politicians with 
evidence-based reports and recommendations that can actually be used in policymaking. The 
experts involved thus need to identify and assess the relevant scientific evidence in a particular 
area, including the uncertainties and risks involved, in a manner that is useful to policymakers. 
Sheila Jasanoff, Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School, 
refers to science that supports policymaking as ‘serviceable truths’ (Jasanoff 1998).
The IPCC’s policy summaries are a good example of this. Climate experts work with 
policymakers on writing a brief summary of the scientific evidence of climate change, tailored to 
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policymakers’ need for relevant policy options. The Health Council’s recommendations 
concerning the HPV vaccine met a similar need: the Council must inform the Minister of Health, 
Welfare and Sport about the pros and cons of policy measures, assess the pros and cons, and 
reach a final conclusion - a recommendation - based on its assessment. This process of 
interpretation and assessment inevitably involves accentuating important findings and omitting 
certain nuances and uncertainties. That makes the work of the advisory councils and research 
institutes vulnerable to the accusation that they have not taken those nuances and uncertainties 
sufficiently into account. The cases show that critical groups and experts can use the 
uncertainties to call the planned policy measures into question.
 
In conclusion, then, policymakers’ custom of relying on established advisory practices is 
vulnerable to criticism, by definition. And the more policy relies on such practices, and the less 
leeway the underlying reports and recommendations leave for alternative views, the more 
vulnerable that custom is. The uproar caused by the errors - relatively minor ones - found in the 
IPCC’s assessment report must be seen in the light of such vulnerability. After all, the 
Netherlands’ climate policy was based on the IPCC reports and there seemed to be little room 
for doubt or discussion. When the InterAcademy Council evaluated the controversy surrounding 
the IPCC’s climate assessment reports, it therefore called on the IPCC to be more transparent 
about its working methods and to communicate more openly about scientific uncertainties.
In assessing and interpreting the available scientific findings, time pressure can also play an 
important role, as seen in the case of the EHEC contamination. The deaths in Germany put the 
research institutes responsible under immense political and public pressure to identify the 
source of the infection. Although the case study does not say it in so many words, the suspicion 
is that the various experts reached incorrect and contradictory conclusions about the source of 
the infection because they were under pressure to produce answers quickly and because of 
faulty coordination between the research institutes involved. This led to immense confusion and 
unrest among consumers, policymakers and the vegetable growers affected by the outcome. 
There were obviously too many uncertainties to identify the precise source of infection, but the 
experts gave in to pressure and reached premature conclusions without having sufficient 
evidence to back up their claims. The urgent circumstances asked too much of them.
The role of ‘serviceable truths’ in supporting and advising on policy is marked by the tension 
between scientific accountability and policy relevance. Scientific recommendations or reports 
that are too far removed from the needs of policymakers lack relevance and make themselves 
superfluous. But experts who are too eager to meet the needs of policymakers run the risk of 
being labelled by other experts or critical groups as insufficiently accountable to science and, 
therefore, untrustworthy.
Research agenda
The role of science in supporting and advising on policy is also vulnerable from the perspective 
of civil society. As soon as policymakers call on advisory councils or research institutes and set 
them a particular advisory task or research assignment, the question is whether that 
assignment accurately reflects the public issue in question.
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Some of the cases show that the groups involved criticised the planned or executed research 
agenda for being too limited. That was true for the Swiss study, accused of ignoring the long-
term health risks of electromagnetic radiation, and the follow-up study on the effects of shale 
gas drilling ordered by Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Infrastructure, faulted with 
failing to study the usefulness and necessity of the drilling operation. These sorts of questions 
also arose during the meetings of the EMV&G Knowledge Platform’s Liaison Group.
The cases show that, time and again, the public raises questions about the breadth of the 
research agenda. That makes the work of advisory councils and research institutes meant to 
support policy vulnerable to the criticism that their research agenda does not take all the 
relevant factors into account. At the same time, the cases also indicate that it is not useful to 
conduct scientific research on every public issue. For example, it is impossible to prove 
scientifically that shale gas drilling will not have a negative impact on the environment, as the 
Municipality of Boxtel demanded. There are always situations imaginable that involve a certain 
risk. It is equally impossible to measure the cumulative effects on human health of everyday 
exposure to electromagnetic radiation in the laboratory.
Broader public concerns
The cases also involved broader public concerns that the policymakers and scientists failed to 
address. They ranged from worries about visual pollution, declining property prices and the 
discomfort of parents having to discuss their teen-age daughter’s (future) sex life with her to the 
feeling that a decision was being forced through in which economic or (in the IPCC case) 
political and ideological motives took precedence over other interests. In some of the cases, the 
groups involved felt that the local community was having to sacrifice too much in the national 
interest, and that the costs and benefits were thus unfairly distributed. Scientific research 
cannot remove these broader concerns. However, because they are partly causing the public 
unrest, they too must be addressed.
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Part IV  Conclusions and  
recommendations
In this study we explored the role of scientific evidence in public controversies about policy 
measures by looking at six cases in the Netherlands. In this final section, we draw conclusions 
and make recommendations concerning the way that scientists and policymakers should deal 
with such controversies.
Conclusion I:   Invoking scientific evidence is not a satisfactory 
response to public controversies
In each of the cases we have studied, the problem was framed in scientific terms, reducing the 
discussion to a scientific issue that had to be resolved. Such reductionism came about because 
the relevant policymakers relied on established advisory practices to substantiate their policy, 
and it was aggravated by the heavy emphasis placed on scientific uncertainties during the 
controversies. Both proponents and opponents of the proposed policy measures wanted to 
remove the scientific uncertainties by ordering research or follow-up research. 
The focus on scientific research falls short for two reasons. First of all, because research can 
never remove all scientific uncertainties, uncertainties will continue to fuel controversies. Even 
when groups and experts critical of a policy are involved in designing the new research, the 
impasse remains. Second, focusing on research means that the discussion does not pay 
sufficient attention to the broader concerns that play a role in the controversies. These 
concerns must be addressed if the policy measures are to gain the public’s support.
Conclusion II:  The authority of science is no longer self-evident
The custom of invoking science also falls short because the very use of science becomes 
controversial. The scientific evidence in support of policy and the scientific advisory practices 
that policymakers customarily rely on to substantiate their decisions are no longer automatically 
authoritative. Individuals and groups appear to have cast off any remaining timidity when it 
comes to debating policymakers and scientists. The public demands a say in the debate. That 
is undoubtedly because people are better educated than ever before, and because for every 
assertion, a search on the Internet will turn up the opposite assertion. Such alternative views 
can be used to question the claims of experts involved in policymaking.
Conclusion III:  Scientific uncertainties require openness
Policymakers and scientists should respond to public opposition by being more open about 
scientific uncertainties. Time and again, uncertainties played a key role in the controversies we 
have studied. Scientific claims about environmental or health risks are inevitably accompanied 
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by scientific uncertainties. To a major extent, the recommendations and substantiation provided 
by scientific advisory committees and research institutes that support policymaking involve 
interpreting and assessing those uncertainties with a view to the relevant policy decisions.
Interpreting and assessing scientific uncertainties is a precarious process that is always 
vulnerable to criticism. In our cases, critical experts interpreted the uncertainties differently and 
arrived at a different assessment of the associated risks. There is therefore little point in 
denying scientific uncertainties or in making research results appear more certain than they 
are. Sooner or later, concealed uncertainties will come to light and only fan the flames of the 
controversy, giving the critics reason to distrust.
Policymakers and experts involved in policymaking must be more open about the scientific 
uncertainties that play a role in policy measures. The policymakers must refrain from asking the 
experts for certainties that do not exist; conversely, the experts must not permit policymakers to 
pressure them into making claims for which there is insufficient scientific evidence.
Conclusion IV:  Parties in civil society should be involved in 
developing the research agenda at the earliest possible stage
The cases show that ordering yet more research will never remove all the scientific 
uncertainties. There will always be new questions to ask that may be relevant when analysing 
certain risks. There are limits to what scientific research can in fact investigate. For example, it 
is impossible to use current scientific methods to measure the cumulative effects on human 
health of everyday exposure to electromagnetic radiation. Science can also never entirely 
exclude the risk of shale gas drilling leading to environmental damage. Safety can never be one 
hundred percent.
The foregoing begs the question of how to identify the boundaries of what science can usefully 
investigate. The boundaries will have to be drawn primarily by the most knowledgeable experts. 
After all, they can provide the best estimate of whether science can answer a certain question. 
Such experts can be either ‘established’ or ‘critical’ scientists. To determine which questions 
should be at the heart of a research agenda, other parties - policymakers, businesses and 
public interest groups - should also provide input. The research agenda should reflect the 
interests and concerns of stakeholders - although always within the boundaries of what is 
scientifically possible.
This means that a platform should be created that enables groups to influence the research 
agenda. Examples of such platforms are the new consultation structures or arrangements that 
were introduced in the various cases, such as the consultation meetings to discuss research on 
the effects of shale gas extraction, or the Knowledge Forums set up in connection with CCS.
The cases also show that these new arrangements were only introduced at a very late stage of 
the process, after the various parties were already entrenched in their positions and the 
controversy seemed unresolvable. The arrangements did not lead to the proponents and 
opponents meeting each other halfway. Too much had already happened for them to 
compromise. The new consultation structures should therefore be introduced much earlier in 
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the process. Parties in civil society should therefore be involved in developing the research 
agenda at the earliest possible stage
Conclusion V:   Parties should be involved in developing the public
agenda at the earliest possible stage
Given our first conclusion, it is not likely that a broader research agenda will suffice as a 
response to public controversies. Time and again, controversies are fuelled by broader interests 
and concerns that are difficult to address in a research agenda. These broader interests and 
concerns are partly the cause of the public unrest and must be given a platform if the policy 
measures are to win enough public support.
Once again, it is important to acknowledge these interests and concerns at the earliest possible 
stage. If that does not happen, then local residents may, for example, feel that their interests are 
subordinate to the profit motives of telecom operators or the financial interests of the National 
Government, quickly leading them to distrust the licensing or decision-making process.
To prevent this from happening, policymakers should take the time early on in the process to 
investigate - in cooperation with all the relevant parties involved, both proponents and 
opponents - what concerns and interests merit a place on the public agenda and how the 
worries can be removed. For example, one way to address the issue of declining property 
values is to offer financial compensation if that value does in fact decline. And the debate about 
the government’s climate policy merits more in-depth political discussion than a mere reference 
to the IPCC’s policy summaries.
Final comment: good enough science
The cases we have studied show that civil society groups grow unyielding in their criticism of 
proposed policy measures and the related scientific findings. Early on, these groups often grow 
suspicious and sceptical of the intentions of businesses, policymakers and the experts involved. 
The case studies leave the impression that the tenacity with which critical groups continue to 
latch on to scientific uncertainties in order to criticise policy measures is due in part to that 
suspicion and scepticism.
Scientific research can never remove every uncertainty. That has repercussions not only for 
how policymakers and the relevant experts deal with such uncertainties, but also for how other 
stakeholders do. Civil society organisations, interest groups and local residents will also have to 
accept that scientific research cannot answer every question, and that it is very difficult to rule 
out every risk.
Daniel Sarewitz, Professor of Science and Society at Arizona State University, has developed 
an interesting proposition in this connection: he believes that the willingness of civil society 
groups to accept scientific uncertainties depends on the extent to which their concerns and 
interests are taken into account in decision-making. Sarewitz refers in this connection to ‘good 
enough science’ (Sarewitz 2013). If the parties involved have enough confidence in the 
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decision-making process, they will be more likely to accept a certain level of scientific certainty 
as ‘good enough’. This insight may be the key to dealing more successfully with public unrest.
There is much to be said for following Sarewitz’s suggestion and embarking early in the 
decision-making process on a discussion with all the relevant parties about the concerns and 
interests that merit a place on the public agenda, about which research agenda should be 
drawn up based on that public agenda, and about what is needed to remove the other concerns 
that science cannot address. It is only under these conditions that policymakers can gain the 
public’s trust concerning complex evidence-based policy.
Good enough science can be regarded as a more robust form of serviceable truths. In the case 
of good enough science, policymakers must once again depend on scientific advisory councils 
and research institutes to substantiate their policy measures. The vulnerability of this system to 
criticism, both scientific and public, will not be removed, but such vulnerability can be made 
manageable by dealing more openly with scientific uncertainties and by acknowledging broader 
public concerns and interests in policymaking.
Recommendations
The above conclusions can be summarised as follows: by giving the public a platform for 
expressing its views (and opposition) and by ceasing to make scientific findings appear more 
certain than they are, we can create a basis of public trust that enables the parties involved to 
accept the scientific underpinnings of policy measures as ‘good enough’.
Based on the foregoing, we make the following recommendations to help policymakers and 
experts involved in policymaking to deal with public controversies about complex evidence-
based policy:
Policymakers should not allow public issues to be framed exclusively in terms of 
science. Broader concerns that cannot be addressed by science always play a role in 
public controversies.
Policymakers should acknowledge the broader concerns and interests during the 
policymaking process. Parties in civil society should be given a platform for expressing 
their views at the earliest possible stage, before the controversy becomes entrenched.
Policymakers should also involve parties in civil society in developing the research 
agenda. Public controversies about evidence-based policy also always involve public 
concerns that can be addressed by science. The research agenda should reflect those 
concerns.
Experts should communicate more openly about scientific uncertainties. They should 
not allow policymakers and parties in civil society to pressure them into making claims 
for which there is insufficient scientific evidence. If policymakers or other parties assert 
that scientific findings are more certain than they actually are, the experts should 
distance themselves from such assertions.
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